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ABSTRACT
The Siege of Petersburg, fought from June 1864 until April 1865, 
led to the eventual surrender of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia 
and the end of the American Civil War. Just as important, however, is its 
role as a case study for soldierly motivation during the war. Historians of 
this time period often emphasize the high rate of desertion from the 
Confederate Army at Petersburg and how it affected the war’s outcome. 
While desertion played a decisive role at Petersburg, the soldiers who 
decided against desertion tell a story that is just as important. This paper 
attempts to explain why roughly 30,000 of Lee’s soldiers in the trenches at 
Petersburg chose to continue fighting during a time when thousands of 
other Confederates risked desertion instead.
What motivated these soldiers to stay? To answer this question, 
this paper primarily uses letters sent between Confederate soldiers 
defending Petersburg and their loved ones in states around the 
Confederacy. Like all armies, the Army of Northern Virginia at Petersburg 
featured a diverse group of individuals, each with different backgrounds 
and life stories. Yet, the sources all demonstrate certain commonalities 
that have allowed for important conclusions about the army as a whole. 
For example, nearly all of the soldiers showed the most concern about the 
fate of their family, property, and home communities, rather than their 
actual safety and well-being.
To the Confederate soldier, honor was everything, and their 
interpretation stemmed from their ability to provide for loved ones while 
defending the well-being of the local community from which they came. 
Men faced with the decision to desert or to fight on looked most of all to 
preserve honor. Those who deserted often did so to return home. 
Likewise, the letters from the soldiers who chose to stay and fight often 
show that they did so in order to defend the well-being of their family and 
property against both real and perceived threats at the end of the war. 
They made the difficult decision to stay and fight during the last days of 
the war for honor’s sake.
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The crisis of our fate is rapidly approaching, and men’s minds are harassed with 
doubts, fears, and perplexity. The weak are for submission and those who have 
more fortitude are affected by the fears of the timid. A few men remain strong 
and if they have them conceal their fears. Are the names of the illustrious dead 
to go down in history as traitors, instead of patriots?
-Confederate General Josiah Gorgas, diary entry from Richmond, March 6, 18651
A few weeks before the end of the American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln 
held a meeting with Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, and Admiral 
David Porter on board the River Queen docked at City Point, Virginia.
Discussing plans for peace, Lincoln expressed the tragic nature not only of the 
end of the Civil War but of all wars, when he asked: “Must more blood be shed?” 
Sherman’s answer was expectedly pessimistic when he characterized Robert E. 
Lee as a “real general” who “would not await the inevitable conclusion but would 
make one more desperate effort” to avoid having to surrender.2 While this 
prediction proved true, it was not only Lee who continued to fight, but thousands 
of others in his army -  men who refused to give up when a decisive military 
victory was impossible. At Appomattox Courthouse, only hours before Robert E. 
Lee eventually surrendered, “more blood was shed” during vicious fighting that 
cost the country roughly five hundred more fatalities, many of them occurring 
only moments before peace was restored.3
Each of the men present for the fighting at Appomattox Courthouse tells 
an important story about the war. Those who lost their lives that morning mark
1 Josiah Gorgas, The Civil War Diary of General Josiah Gorgas, ed. Frank E. Vandiver 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1947), 174-175.
Bruce Catton, The Centennial History of the Civil War, Volume III: Never Call Retreat (Garden 
City: Doubleday, 1965), 440.
3 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army: From Victory to Collapse (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2008), 463.
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the unaffordable cost of the war’s final stages, when each minute threatened 
further violence in a country longing for peace. In Why Confederates Fought, 
Aaron Sheehan-Dean writes that “war, perhaps more than any other human 
activity, invites explanations that ignore individuals.”4 His observation is an 
important one that calls to attention the countless decisions and actions made by 
common citizens forced to exist during times of war. At a minimum, for a war to 
occur there must be individual combatants who are motivated to kill. Likewise, 
for a war to end, individuals must somehow be motivated to stop killing. During 
the final months of the Civil War in Virginia, thousands of Confederate soldiers in 
the Army of Northern Virginia had to decide whether to desert the trenches or to 
continue fighting Grant’s army. Many of these soldiers, for various reasons, 
chose to stay. In fact, there were roughly 28,000 Confederate soldiers present 
for the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, and this number does not include 
those who were either captured by Union forces, died, or were otherwise 
incapable of marching with the army during its escape from Petersburg.5 While 
other Confederate armies remained in the field after Lee’s surrender, these 
soldiers were the last hope for Southerners who still dreamed of independence. 
What forces motivated these individuals to stay in the trenches when thousands 
of others chose to desert instead?
4 Aaron Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought: Family and Nation in Civil War Virginia 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2007), 8.
Jay Winik, April 1865: The Month that Saved America (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 197. 
Other statistics for the occasion include 26,765 prisoners in David J. Eicher’s The Longest Night: 
A Military History of the Civil War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 821 and 27, 647 
prisoners in Chris Calkins’s The Appomattox Campaign, March 29-April 9, 1865 (Conshohocken: 
Combined Books, 1997), 187-192.
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Motives are always difficult to ascertain, especially in a situation as chaotic 
as war. Further complicating matters is the fact that no soldier acted in a 
vacuum. Instead, each man had to decide to either stay or desert over time, 
based upon imperfect information, and in a world full of onlookers who included 
friends, family members, fellow soldiers, and commanding officers. We may 
never fully understand why individual Confederate soldiers at Petersburg acted 
as they did. Efforts to do so, however, allow for a better understanding of the 
end of the Civil War in Virginia; they help to explain both why there was a 
desperate retreat from Petersburg, and why General Lee’s Army of Northern 
Virginia did not resort to guerrilla warfare as Union leaders greatly feared at the 
time.
Bruce Catton described the orderly outcome of Lee’s final retreat as an 
“unbelievable way to end a civil war, which by all tradition is the worst kind of war 
there is.”6 Such a belief is certainly common among historians. That the soldiers 
who overcame immense hardship to continue fighting -  when desertion was a 
serious albeit dangerous option -  peacefully returned home after their surrender 
at Appomattox Courthouse is a testament to the leaders of both armies and their 
terms for peace. The chain of events ending at Appomattox Courthouse, 
however, also highlights the feelings of uneasiness and mistrust that were 
common among Confederate soldiers concerning the potential consequences of 
a Union victory. In 1865, Abraham Lincoln described the troops who continued 
to resist as “deluded,” recognizing the fatal misunderstanding between 
Confederates who were still suspicious of the Union army’s intentions and the
6 Catton, Never Call Retreat, 456.
3
Federal leaders who continued to push for reunion and emancipation as their 
conditions for peace.7
A significant portion of these soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia at 
the end of the war viewed the continuation of military duty as the most honorable 
option available to them. Historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown defines an antebellum, 
southern version of honor as “essentially the cluster of ethical rules, most readily 
found in societies of small communities, by which judgments of behavior are 
ratified by community consensus.”8 The decisions to stay or leave the trenches 
included this definition of honor and caused Confederate soldiers to be most 
concerned about how best to secure the rights, welfare, and respect of their 
families and the local communities they came from. The soldiers who stayed 
were as tired of war as the rest of the country and made their decisions 
reluctantly, but they often concluded that duty in Lee’s army remained the most 
honorable choice.
By the beginning of 1865, these soldiers found themselves caught 
between a cherished past and a rapidly changing present that included the 
federal government’s embrace of the elimination of slavery as a war aim and 
devastating invasions by Union armies throughout the Confederacy. Fears 
concerning the future and the war’s eventual effects upon southern homes and 
communities added to the uncertainty of combat itself. In such an existence, it is 
not surprising that many rumors about the war spread rapidly in Petersburg’s 
trenches. Southern honor, according to Wyatt-Brown, initially developed to give
7 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 574.
8 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (Oxford: Oxford 
University, 1982), xv.
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meaning to lives and “provided a means to restrict human choices, to point a way 
out of chaos.”9 At Petersburg, however, Lee and his soldiers could not escape 
the chaos, and their concerns about honor further complicated their situation. 
Nevertheless, thousands of these soldiers fought on to defend themselves, their 
families and their beliefs by placing their faith in General Lee, the army, and -  on 
the most practical level -  a struggle to defend the important railroad junction at 
Petersburg against a much larger Union force.
9 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 114.
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1. “Chained Down”
When the Civil war entered its fifth, and what would turn out to be its final 
year, the nature of the conflict had escalated into something noticeably different 
than in earlier stages of the fighting. Whether or not it had become a “total war” 
or a “modern war” is debatable, but it had reached a new level of ferocity that 
served to bring the Confederate experiment to the brink of failure. In Virginia, the 
armies of Lee and Grant fought the bloodiest campaign of the war. At earlier 
points, combat had been just as lethal as it became on the road to Petersburg, 
but it had never been as protracted. In his memoirs, Ulysses S. Grant said that 
the campaign had encompassed the most “desperate fighting as the world has 
ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, or a single 
season. The losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe/’10 
Grant’s campaign would, along with other offensives throughout the South, spur 
the collapse of the Confederacy and bring an end to the war. The battles leading 
up to the Siege of Petersburg cost Lee roughly 33,000 casualties. Further 
casualties at Petersburg were irreplaceable for a Confederate army that had lost 
the ability to recruit new soldiers.11 The Confederacy not only began the war with 
a smaller population than Union states, but many of the Southerners affected by 
war also lost enthusiasm for the Confederate cause during the years leading up 
to the clash at Petersburg.
Furthermore, the effects of the Siege of Petersburg on the Army of 
Northern Virginia were paralyzing. The most obvious result was in the attrition of
10 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs and Letters (New York: LOA, 1990), 512.
11 John Keegan, The American Civil War: A Military History (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 
252.
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its size and strength. Many months of heavy casualties and the effects of 
disease and sickness left the army with too few men to defend a rapidly 
lengthening line of defense. Confederate General Cadmus M. Wilcox recorded 
that his men sometimes stood thirty paces apart in order to defend their 
section.12 The historian Douglas Southall Freeman characterizes the Army of 
Northern Virginia’s predicament by the summer of 1864 as being “chained down 
and unable to employ the offensive strategy that had won it many battles.”13
Along with external pressures that included Union military successes in 
other regions and Abraham Lincoln’s re-election in 1864, the time Confederate 
soldiers spent in the trenches defending Petersburg caused high rates of 
desertion. More so than any other battle, the Siege of Petersburg prompted the 
choice between desertion and persistence. Out of an army that entered the 
trenches at Petersburg with roughly 50,000 men, one well-researched estimate 
claims that between 7,000 and 8,000 Confederate soldiers deserted during the 
final three months of the siege alone.14 One brigade of South Carolinians, 
initially numbering around 1,000 men at the beginning of August, 1864, lost 104 
soldiers to desertion during the war’s final eight months.15
Desertion from the army had always been a problem for the Confederacy, 
but the hard fighting of 1864 served to accentuate its effects on the shrinking
12 A. Wilson Greene, Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion: The Final Battles of the Petersburg 
Campaign (Mason City, Savas, 2000), 282.
13 Douglass Southall Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, vol. 3 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 
541.
14 John Horn, The Petersburg Campaign: June 1 8 6 4 -April 1865 (Cambridge: Da Kapo, 1993), 
217.
15 J.F.J. Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians: First Known as “Gregg’s” and 
Subsequently as “McGowan’s Brigade” (Dayton: Morningside, 1992), 221, 256. Initially published 
in 1866 in Philadelphia, Caldwell wrote the majority of this unit history at Petersburg at the 
insistence of his commander, Brigadier General Samuel McGowan.
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army. Foreshadowing the future, Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis before the 
renewal of fighting in 1864 that “desertion and absence without leave are nearly 
the only offenses ever tried by our courts. They appear to be the only vices in 
the army.”16 During the Petersburg Campaign, desertion also became the 
foremost signal of a deteriorating Confederacy. While there were many reasons 
that thousands of soldiers deserted from Petersburg, the failing war effort was at 
the root of this increase. Historian James McPherson broadly concludes that 
“the rising southern desertion rate was primarily a result of defeat, not a cause.”17 
First of all, the siege directly affected the physical condition of the soldiers, 
serving to test the limits of human agony and endurance. One particular 
hardship concerned the clothing and shelter of the army during its final winter. 
The military historian J. Tracy Power found that “the lack of adequate clothing, 
shoes, and blankets was often cited as a major reason for the increased number 
of desertions as winter set in and some soldiers went over to the enemy to 
acquire them.” Other Confederates, unwilling to desert, on one occasion 
attacked a group of Union pickets for no other reason than to steal their 
“overcoats, shoes, and blankets.”18 One South Carolinian described the pain 
involved when he wrote that “shoes were scarce. More than once a soldier left a 
bloody track on the frozen picket line.”19 Fuel shortages only made the situation 
worse. According to Joseph Glatthaar, hospitals in Richmond no longer had
16 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 408.
17 James McPherson, “American Victory, American Defeat,” Why the Confederacy Lost, ed.
Gabor S. Boritt (New York: Oxford University, 1992), 29.
18 J. Tracy Power, Lee’s Miserables: Life in the Army of Northern Virginia from the Wilderness to 
Appomattox (Chapel Hill: UNC, 1998), 223.
19 Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, 255.
enough wood or coal to keep their buildings warm.20 The lack of proper clothing 
and materials during the Petersburg winter, along with a seemingly endless 
struggle against the Army of the Potomac, caused many Confederates to desert, 
and these hardships became an obstacle that many others either overcame or 
died trying.
Hunger was an equally significant problem for the soldiers. While the 
siege did not completely isolate Richmond from the outside world, it applied 
enough pressure to slowly reduce the soldiers’ rations. Occasionally the men 
would write positively about what they had to eat, as when Fred A. Brode, a 
Louisiana soldier, wrote to his sister enthusiastically about his Christmas Day 
dinner in 1864.21 When rations were adequate, as they were that day, morale 
was naturally higher. Dinners such as the Christmas feast, however, quickly 
became the exception. By the beginning of 1865, troops rarely received more 
than some bread or cornmeal for their rations. Lieutenant J.F.J. Caldwell 
recorded in his unit’s history that “it was amusing, as well as sad, to see the 
delight of the troops over a drop of comfort. All this time the enemy drank coffee, 
ate fat, fresh beef, and good bread.”22 Nutritional deficiencies caused a scurvy 
epidemic as well as a high number of pneumonia cases.23 Nathaniel Venable 
Watkins of the 14th Virginia Infantry wrote in January 1865 to his wife that the 
rations had “considerably reduced. I fear the number of desertions will
20 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 448.
21 CpI. Fred A. Brode to his sister Josephine Trenchard, 27 December 1864, Brode Papers, 
Museum of the Confederacy Archives (MOC), Richmond, VA.
22 Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, 255.
23 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 446.
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increase.”24 J. Tracy Power writes of the army’s response to its soldiers’ 
complaints that “commissary officers often responded to such reports with 
various explanations that were technically correct but displayed little sympathy 
for the plight of the soldiers in the ranks.”25 While these hardships helped to 
cause widespread desertion and the eventual Confederate defeat, the soldiers 
who stayed somehow developed the ability to overcome them in order to base 
their decisions upon matters other than day-to-day survival and comfort.
The best example of this characteristic is the way soldiers responded to 
news about Union victories across other regions in the South as well as the war’s 
political implications. Because the Confederate soldiers at Petersburg 
maintained the ability to think in strategic and political terms, incoming news 
rather than the daily misery of trench life caused the most fluctuation between 
hope and despair among soldiers manning the front lines. They understood that 
the lack of proper food and clothing was a national phenomenon and was largely 
a consequence of the naval blockades as well as the campaigns of Sherman and 
Union General Philip Sheridan in other theaters of the war. News updates on 
these events served to squeeze hope out of the Confederate people as well as 
the men in Lee’s army.
Another example involves the 1864 Union presidential election. James 
McPherson writes that the “election was a referendum on the war and 
emancipation. No one could be entirely sure what the consequences of a
24 Capt. Nathaniel V. Watkins to his wife, 19 January 1865, Watkins Papers, Swem Library 
Special Collections (SWEM), College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA.
25 Power, Lee’s Miserables, 224.
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Democratic victory would be.”26 To the soldiers in the Confederate trenches 
surrounding Petersburg, Lincoln’s re-election would protract an already lengthy 
war whereas his defeat might help the Confederate cause. In an episode that 
served as a microcosm for the war as a political conflict, Confederate and Union 
pickets carrying on a peaceful conversation outside Petersburg once broke into a 
fight after one of the Southerners called Lincoln a “damned abolitionist.”27 The 
strength of Democratic Presidential candidate George McClellan was promising 
enough to prevent many Confederates from deserting throughout the fall, and it 
made politics the central focus of those who endured the miseries of trench life 
on a daily basis.
In this hopeful climate leading up to the Presidential election of 1864 
rumors circulated through the Army of Northern Virginia that peace might come 
soon. From the trenches on July 26, 1864, Fred A. Brode wrote home to his 
sister, Josephine Trenchard, that he hoped “this fall will decide the fate of this 
war, and give peace once more. I should not be surprised if the next Presidential 
Campaign will settle this thing. I do not believe that the people in the North will 
stand it much [longer]. They are getting tired of the war I think.”28 Shortly after 
the Democratic national convention in 1864, Nathaniel Watkins wrote home 
excitedly curious about what his wife thought of McClellan while explaining his 
own approval of the nomination.29 Much to many of the Confederate soldiers’ 
disappointment, Lincoln was re-elected on November 8, 1864. Afterwards, some
26 James McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: the Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1997), 492.
27 Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox (New York: Random House, 1988), 562.
28 Fred A. Brode to his sister Josephine Trenchard, 26 July 1864, MOC.
29 Nathaniel V. Watkins to his wife, September 10, 1864, SWEM.
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soldiers began to doubt that there could ever be peace, as when Luther Swank of 
Virginia wrote home that “Old Abe is elected again and all hopes of an honorable 
peace are yet far in the distance.”30 Others somehow managed to twist the news 
optimistically, as when one Virginian believed that Lincoln’s “election will cause a 
revolution in the North West, while McClellan, if elected, will be able to rally more 
men to the army.”31 Power explains that such optimism remained among 
Confederate soldiers, “perhaps as much to reassure themselves as to convince 
their families and friends.”32
The most important result of Lincoln’s re-election in 1864 was the 
affirmation that the war would continue until the Union was restored. From the 
Confederate trenches, the results of the November elections triggered mostly 
pessimism. Captain Elmore Hall, for example, wrote home to his father that “We 
are in for four years more -  Well, I can stand it, and on my own account don’t 
dread it at all, but I do feel for the many in our country who will suffer from it.”33 
While Hall believed he would persevere, many in the army did not. The news of 
Lincoln’s re-election along with the coming of cold weather sent waves of 
surrendering Confederates to Union pickets. One Confederate soldier informed 
another that he would be deserting, because “A. Lincoln is elected for four more 
years” and that “he could not stand the idea of hardship of four more long years 
of war.”34
30 Luther L. Swank to his sister Kate, 19 November 1864, Library of Virginia Archives (LOV), 
Richmond, VA.
31 Aaron Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought, 175.
32 Power, Lee’s Miserables, 218-219.
33 Ibid., 218.
34 Ibid., 219.
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One reason that desertion became especially problematic for the 
Confederate government at Petersburg was the mindset of the individual soldier. 
Joseph Glatthaar believes that “Confederates came from a society that 
encouraged independence and independent-mindedness.” Because of this 
characteristic, Lee always had a difficult time “breaking soldiers of the practices 
of leaving the line with wounded comrades, just drifting away from combat 
because they did not feel like fighting, or plundering in the midst of battle.”35 In 
the final months at Petersburg, particularly after the re-election of Abraham 
Lincoln, soldiers not only deserted more frequently, but an increasing number 
simply went over to the Union army. That so many of them left for enemy lines at 
this time also forced both armies to make important decisions regarding the 
actions of these soldiers. These men did not leave directly for home, but instead 
risked immediate surrender to enemy forces, in many cases to avoid being 
arrested by other Confederates for desertion.
The most obvious cause of this phenomenon was the failure of the 
Confederacy to provide for the army. By the end of the war, writes Bruce Catton, 
“The Confederacy was visibly failing -  in manpower, in rations, in equipment.” 
One Federal officer reported that forty deserters came to his lines over a span of 
forty-eight hours, noting that this statistic was about average. One of these 
deserters was sixty years of age and immediately began cursing the 
Confederacy in front of a group of Union soldiers. “When these men talked about 
the Southern cause, it was said, they would remark that it was a rich man’s war
35 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 466
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and a poor man’s fight.” 36 To many Union observers, it was simply war 
weariness and contempt for the Confederacy that drove these men to desert and 
surrender. While these issues undoubtedly motivated Confederates to leave 
their trenches, the growing trend was also a result of a Union strategy to 
communicate their merciful plans for peace to the Confederates defending 
Petersburg.
The men who voluntarily surrendered were a valuable asset to the Union 
army in many ways. First of all they provided Federal officers with significant 
intelligence regarding the size and morale of Lee’s army. Second, the Union 
army promoted Confederates’ desertion as a weapon by directly appealing to 
additional Confederate soldiers to desert and surrender. In August 1864, Grant 
issued his Circular No. 31, “which stated that rebel deserters could not be 
enrolled, drafted, used as substitutes, or otherwise recruited into the United 
States Army.” Going even further, he also offered the deserters (along with 
Southern civilians) high payments for weapons, ammunition, animals, and others 
supplies. Last, and most important, he agreed to transport new defectors back to 
their homes if the territory was under Union control. Added to this promise were 
generous job offers on the railroads or in telegraph offices behind the front 
lines.37
Before these offers, Grant had also stopped the exchange of prisoners in 
order to further wound the Confederacy’s supply of soldiers. In contrast to 
capture, voluntary surrender offered what a P.O.W. camp could not: peace, food,
36 Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox, 652-653.
37 Mark A. Weitz, A Higher Duty: Desertion among Georgia Troops during the Civil War (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 2000), 57.
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money, and the possibility of going home permanently to friends and family. To 
communicate his message to Confederate soldiers, Grant took advantage of the 
interactions formed between opposing men on picket duty, which tended to be 
relatively peaceful throughout the war. How well the message passed through 
Confederate trenches is difficult to determine, but Grant’s merciful offers fell in 
line with Federal peace plans and seem to have been one of the few avenues 
that Lincoln’s government used to communicate directly to the people Lincoln 
himself described as “deluded.” The soldiers who actually made it to Union lines 
during this time validated a strategy that helped end the war with less bloodshed 
than might otherwise have ensued. According to historian Mark A. Weitz, writing 
specifically about Georgian deserters, these men helped to “seed occupied areas 
in the South with reconstructed soldiers, who might make the transition of its 
civilian population easier once the war [ended].”38
Part of Grant’s order that would have been most appealing to the 
Confederates was his promise to send deserters home after taking an oath of 
loyalty to the Union. The ability to return home to take care of families was the 
highest and most honorable priority for many men, especially as families and 
farms threatened to fall apart in the final year of the war. For example, Annie 
Evans, anticipating the coming of Sherman’s army, wrote to her husband at 
Petersburg: “I can hardly tell you my anxieties and fears for a few days past. I 
feel sometimes almost ready to faint by the way -  so much excitement, so many 
thousand rumors, and so much turmoil every way.”39 Another wife wrote to her
38 Weitz, A Higher Duty, 58.
39 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 449.
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husband simply: “I want you to come home as soon as you can after you get this 
letter.”40 Letters from wives and other family members had a profound influence 
on soldiers, but the eventual absence of letters caused by Union occupation 
made the pull of home even stronger. Sherman’s March in particular forced 
many Confederates out of the trenches to search for answers about their 
families.
Internal pressures faced by soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia -  
mainly lack of food, supplies, and equipment -  laid the foundation for a high rate 
of desertion at Petersburg. Concerns about friends and families back home, 
however, had a stronger influence over the soldiers who eventually deserted. 
Also, external events such as Sherman’s March often became the tipping point 
for many deserters. While there were soldiers of every type who deserted, those 
who earned less money, who did not own slaves, who were fighting closer to 
home, and who had children deserted at a slightly higher rate.41 The best 
conclusion about both deserters and non-deserters, though, comes from Ella 
Lonn’s 1928 study of Civil War desertion: “All Southern soldiers had a strong 
consciousness of themselves as free moral agents; they were wholly 
unaccustomed to acting on any other than their own motion.”42
By 1865, however, Confederate soldiers choosing to desert from the Army 
of Northern Virginia would find it more difficult to act on “their own motion.” Some 
even concluded that desertion was too much of a risk and decided to stay for this
40 Reid Mitchell, “The Perseverance of Soldiers,” Why the Confederacy Lost, ed. GaborS. Boritt 
(New York: Oxford University, 1992), 126.
Ibid., 109-110.
42 Ella Lonn, Desertion during the Civil War (Gloucester: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), 15.
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reason alone. In the past, men who were caught deserting could expect a death 
sentence, but were more often sentenced to hard labor or a forfeiture of pay. In 
the spring of 1864, Lee began to see that changes were going to be necessary 
when he wrote to Jefferson Davis about deserters, “It is certain that a relaxation 
of the sternness of discipline as a mere act of indulgence, unsupported by good 
reasons, is followed by an increase in the number of offenders.”43 From the 
perspective of the Confederate leadership, the war had always been about 
getting soldiers to fight. Consequently, during the Siege of Petersburg, the minds 
of the individual Confederate soldiers became the primary battleground. Lee had 
to motivate his soldiers to continue to kill the enemy, while Grant was doing his 
best to convince them of the merits of surrender.
Here, the conflict between military and domestic needs was unavoidable. 
By the final year of the war, more families were suffering than ever before, yet 
the Confederate armies were still in need of every man who could fight. In the 
past, state governments had focused much of their recruiting efforts on assuring 
soldiers that their families would be taken care of. As late as April 1864, at least 
one Alabama county continued to recruit volunteers by raising funds for families 
left at home.44 In the ideal Confederate world, armies would have had enough 
soldiers to defend farms and plantations while those plantations sustained the
43 Robert E. Lee to Jefferson Davis, 13 April 1864, in ed. Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s 
Dispatches: Unpublished Letters of General Robert E. Lee, C.S.A., to Jefferson Davis and the 
War Department of the Confederate States of America, 1862-1865 (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State 
University, 1994), 156.
44 Bessie Martin, Desertion of Alabama Troops From the Confederate Army: A Study in 
Sectionalism (New York: AMS Press, 1966), 168. Named the Central Aid Society of Talladega, 
the organization promised to donate $20,000 annually to families whose men left for war. During 
the final year of the war, they no longer had the ability to support at least 3,979 individuals then in 
need and had to rely on taxation rather than voluntary contributions.
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welfare of local families. Instead, families and plantations alike suffered from the 
pressures of war. Volunteers continued to join and many soldiers continued to 
fight, but it had also become obvious that neither local organizations nor the 
government had the ability to support the families of soldiers.
A similar strategy meant to benefit the families at home was the furlough 
system. Before Petersburg, Lee often granted furloughs to soldiers as a way to 
raise the morale of his troops, especially veterans and those dealing with family 
crises at home. Many historians have concluded that the Union army’s promise 
of a thirty-day furlough was reward enough to impel a majority of Union veterans 
to re-enlist and “hazard three years more of hell.”45 But the Confederacy could 
not afford to have soldiers go on furlough from the trenches of Petersburg. In 
addition to creating immediate manpower shortages, the lucky few soldiers who 
left Petersburg on furlough often remained home illegally for the remainder of the 
conflict. In 1865, only one in every 100 soldiers received a furlough, and these 
soldiers had to be from regions of the Confederacy not yet taken by Union armies 
(the latter encompassing parts of South Carolina, North Carolina, Louisiana, and 
Virginia). Lee did, however, offer furloughs to soldiers who could somehow 
recruit new volunteers from home, though this was virtually impossible by 1865.40 
Unable to send soldiers home or support the families of soldiers, the Confederate 
government needed new methods to prevent desertion. Confederate leaders 
such as Lee and General James Longstreet concluded that the threat of 
punishment was their only choice.
45 Gerald Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War 
(New York: The Free Press, 1987), 263.
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One Confederate deserter, whether correct or not, put into words the 
Confederacy’s greatest predicament after Union cavalry captured him in the 
Shenandoah Valley: “Large numbers of Lee’s army are deserting daily; 
sometimes as many as 200 a day. At least half would desert if they had the 
opportunity.”47 This soldier’s belief that many in the army could not desert might 
have had something to do with Lee’s attempts to change the way his army 
functioned. During World War II, Soviet leadership coerced its troops to fight the 
Germans by placing a rank of machine guns behind them during battle. Although 
soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia rarely experienced such extreme 
treatment, many of the changes were made with similar purposes in mind. Lee 
and Longstreet obviously understood the importance of limiting every opportunity 
that their men had to escape the military -  especially while Grant was running a 
successful campaign to incite desertion from the Confederate trenches. The 
picket line was where the Confederate army decided to focus its efforts to stop 
desertion, largely because Grant’s tactics were proving successful. Writing home 
in the summer of 1864, Brode described the normal process of trading with 
Yankee pickets: Confederates would give Union men tobacco while receiving 
coffee in return. But on this day, he wrote, “even this has stopped, and I am very 
glad of it, as it gives the men too much chance to desert. Any man going in front 
of the line of pickets is to be shot.”48 How many of these deserters were shot at 
Petersburg is unknown, but the new rule was especially noticeable to Union 
soldiers in opposing trenches. Bruce Catton concludes that “heavy firing on the
47 Power, Lee’s Miserables, 236.
48 CpI. Fred A. Brode to his sister Josephine Trenchard, 27 December 1864, Brode Papers, MOC.
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picket lines was always taken to mean that the enemy was trying to keep 
deserters away.”49
After Longstreet recovered from wounds that he received at the Battle of 
the Wilderness and returned to duty, he advised and implemented further 
changes to fight desertion. He first ordered that abatis (large, sharpened 
obstacles) be placed in front of his own picket lines to block the interaction with 
Union soldiers where possible. He also positioned his most disloyal units across 
from Union colored regiments, because few Confederate soldiers were willing to 
suffer the supposed dishonor of surrendering to them. In addition to these 
measures, Longstreet warned his soldiers that “remedies of the most severe kind 
are required to keep the army together this winter.”50
Lee also took more extreme measures to, as Glatthaar writes, “change the 
culture of his army.”51 In his General Order No. 8, Lee warned that “The penalty 
for advising or persuading a soldier to desert is death.”52 Later, he appointed 
what were called “fire closers.” These men wore special badges and received 
orders to prevent straggling during marches; they would stand behind their own 
soldiers in the trenches “with loaded guns and fixed bayonets.”53 Like Soviet 
soldiers during World War II, the Confederate soldiers, during what became the 
final two months of the war, theoretically faced the threat of immediate death 
from men within their own army if they attempted to desert.
49 Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox, 652.
50 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 435.
51 Ibid., 455.
52 Power, Lee’s Miserables, 262.
53 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 455.
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The changes in the Army of Northern Virginia, however, were often 
ineffective. Often, soldiers refused to fire on their comrades or “deliberately fired 
away from them.” Moreover, a sympathetic understanding of desertion existed 
among the men, as demonstrated by comments made by enlisted soldiers about 
an Alabama Captain’s desertion: “Captain Reaves was not disloyal. He is like 
many another man.”54 Virginian John J. Trainer made light of a desertion attempt 
in which “some of our boys would holler over to them [the Union army] that here 
is your peace commissioners.”55 Even so, as Glatthaar observes, “the mere fact 
that the Confederacy had to post pickets in the rear of the army spoke 
volumes.”56
A code of honor that prioritized the family and local communities initially 
served to motivate men during times of chaos. At the end of the Civil War at 
Petersburg, however, honor only caused confusion for Confederates faced with 
the decision to leave the trenches for home. Just as men in the trenches often 
forgave those who deserted, deserters also felt badly for those they left behind. 
One group of North Carolinians left a note before parting that “explained their 
reasons for leaving, asked their comrades to forgive them, and said they 
intended ‘to take 60 days furlough’ and return, assuring that they meant ‘no 
crime’ by their actions.”57 For many, there was no longer an honorable course of 
action, only a difficult decision among equally dishonorable outcomes.
54 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 451.
55 John J. Trainer to his sister, February 10, 1865, Trainer Papers, LOV.
56 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 451.
57 Power, Lee’s Miserable, 261-262.
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The term desertion carries with it connotations of cowardice and disloyalty. 
Yet it is possible, especially given the unusually high rate of desertion over such 
a short span of time at the end of the Civil War, that the majority of Confederate 
soldiers came to respect the need for deserters to reach their families as an act 
no less noble than fighting. Some men may have stayed simply because they 
did not think they could make it home, or because they feared being shot by a 
fellow Confederate while attempting to flee. After all this, though, the Army of 
Northern Virginia still remained a product of its own people and produced an 
environment in which desertion was difficult to prevent. As the Union army 
gained the ability to threaten the safety of every family in the South, Confederate 
soldiers often deserted without losing the respect of the men who decided to 
stay.
Confederate soldiers in Lee’s army took pride in free will: they did not want 
to be “chained down” by either the Union Army or their own leaders as they were 
at Petersburg. When they felt that their service to the government or to the 
military no longer offered an honorable means to defend friends and family at 
home, many deserted. As one anonymous man complained to Georgia 
Governor Joseph Brown: “Must myself and my wife have our hearts torn from us, 
dripping with patriotic blood?”58 One deserter made clear his opinion regarding 
honor when he wrote, “I love my country as dear as anyone, but am unwilling to 
sacrifice domestic happiness to good public opinion. Anyone that would do it is 
unworthy of either.”59 For many, however, the decision was more difficult. While
58 Weitz, A Higher Duty, 121.
59 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 411.
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those who stayed and those who deserted acted differently in the end, their 
motivations often revolved around the ability to maintain independence and 
defend honor. Above all, both deserters and non-deserters were conscious, and 
often critical, of the weaknesses and failures of a Confederate government that 
could no longer support or defend its people from the chaos of war.
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2. Honor before Peace 
As the Confederate and Union armies settled in for a siege in front of 
Petersburg during the final half of 1864, political events and elections came to 
reflect the will of many Confederate people to carry on a faltering war effort. Just 
as Lincoln’s re-election at the end of 1864 signaled a Union commitment to 
victory, Confederate elections during that time reveal much about the resolve of 
civilians and soldiers to continue resisting. The 1864 North Carolina 
gubernatorial race between the incumbent Zebulon Vance and William Holden, 
for example, turned into a contest exclusively focused on war and peace. Vance, 
though a persistent critic of Jefferson Davis and the government in Richmond, 
nevertheless promised a commitment to Confederate independence: “No 
reconstruction or submission, but perpetual independence.” On the other hand, 
Holden and his supporters ran on a peace platform, acknowledging that “if the 
people of North Carolina are for perpetual conscription, impressments, and 
seizures to keep up a perpetual, devastating and exhausting war, let them vote 
for Governor Vance.”60
James McPherson characterizes this election as “the most serious internal 
threat to the Confederacy” up to that time in the war and writes that Holden’s 
plans might have led North Carolina back into the Union.61 Instead, the 
population of North Carolina showed a determination to continue fighting the 
Yankees and voted overwhelmingly for Zebulon Vance. Furthermore, of the 
15,033 soldiers who voted in the election, 13,209 decided to support Vance -  the
60 Glenn Tucker, Zeb Vance: Champion of Personal Freedom (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 
360-361.
61 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York, Oxford, 2003), 698.
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candidate who “would fight the war to the finish” in order to secure an honorable 
peace.62 These soldiers from North Carolina were tired of war, but a 
considerable majority remained unwilling to give in to Union demands. For these 
individuals and many other Confederate soldiers defending of Petersburg, 
fighting the war remained the most honorable choice.
The men of the Army of Northern Virginia held diverse opinions about the 
war. Yet there were common strains of thought that existed among those who 
decided to stay. Many of them concluded for various reasons that military duty in 
the Confederate army was the best way to defend their homes and families from 
the increasingly aggressive tactics of the invading armies of the Union. In his 
influential book about Civil War soldiers, For Cause and Comrades, James 
McPherson admits that there were soldiers who became “negative, cynical, and 
callous” as the war progressed, and that “without question there was a decline in 
the romantic flag-waving rhetoric of the war’s first two years.” Yet McPherson 
concludes that “this is not the whole story. Indeed it is not even the most 
important part of the story.”63 Pointing out continued enthusiasm for the war until 
the very end, historian Jason Phillips similarly recognizes that many soldiers
c
“saw and fought a war radically different from the one we imagine in retrospect.” 
Calling these soldiers “diehard rebels,” Phillips believes not only that many 
Confederates desired to fight it out until the end, but that they expressed a
62 Tucker, Zeb Vance, 360, 366.
63 James McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men fought in the Civil War (New York: 
Oxford, 1997), 168.
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“resilient ethos” and a “culture of invincibility”64 Just as thousands of soldiers 
chose to desert from Petersburg for the honorable defense of loved ones at 
home, many others chose to stay with the Army of Northern Virginia for the same 
reasons. Of these, many even believed that they could still win the war.
One important reason for misplaced Confederate confidence was General 
Lee. As long as Robert E. Lee, called “Uncle Robert” or “Marse Robert” by his 
soldiers, was in command, there would be Confederate soldiers willing to 
overcome hardships and fight to the finish. His ability to keep an army of 
thousands in the field during the final months of the war affected events as much 
as any other factor. At Petersburg, Lee became representative of the many men 
who did not desert him, and those same men shared a desire to emulate the 
unwavering sense of duty apparent in their general. Most important, Lee became 
a final but potent symbol of hope for soldiers and civilians alike who wanted to 
believe that independence was still possible. Author Clifford Dowdey believes 
that, during “the months of long agony while the Confederacy was disintegrating 
around the Richmond-Petersburg stronghold, there were thousands of soldiers 
with Lee who never believed they could be defeated with Uncle Robert.”65 One 
Alabama soldier wrote home that “we are not a frade of the Yankees while we 
have old General Lee to lead us in the fites.” Another relayed to his family that 
“what Marse Robert says is gospel in this squad -  the A.N.V.”66 At the beginning 
of 1865, the Richmond Examiner reported: “We hear from all parts of the
64 Jason Phillips, Diehard Rebels: The Confederate Culture of Invincibility (Athens, University of 
Georgia, 2007), 2-8.
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Richmond lines that the appointment of General Lee to the command of all 
armies of the Confederacy has been the cause of great reanimation in the
_ , »67army.
One soldier who stayed with General Lee until the end was Carlton 
McCarthy, who later wrote a memoir about his experiences as a private in the 
army. A vivid description about what the soldiers thought of their commanding 
general arose from events shortly after the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse. 
McCarthy recalled in 1882 that “not a man was heard to blame General Lee. On 
the contrary, all expressed the greatest sympathy for him and declared their 
willingness to submit at once, or fight to the last man, as he ordered.” During 
both the siege and the escape along the Appomattox River, the soldiers 
experienced numerous hardships. While soldiers continually blamed the 
Confederate government and its leadership, few ever blamed Lee. In fact, as 
McCarthy wrote, “At no period in the war was he held in higher veneration or 
regarded with more sincere affection.”68 For many soldiers fearful about what the 
future might bring, Lee’s presence made the Army of Northern Virginia and its 
long network of defenses appear as the final bulwark of a society torn apart by 
war. He not only avoided denunciation by his men, but became an example of 
duty and honor to men faced with life-threatening decisions.
While Lee was one powerful source of Confederate hope, there were 
other reasons why many soldiers maintained a positive outlook at Petersburg. 
Whereas events during 1864 and 1865 caused many to desert, other soldiers
67 “The Spirit of the Army,” Richmond Examiner, Feb. 3, 1865.
68 Carlton McCarthy, Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia (Richmond: 
Carlton McCarthy and Company, 1882), 154.
27
found the ability to cope by believing certain rumors that have proven untrue in 
retrospect. Charles Baughman of Virginia, on October 4, 1864, wrote to his 
father about a story concerning Sherman’s army in Atlanta, “We heard here last 
night that [Joe] Wheeler had compelled Sherman to evacuate Atlanta and that he 
[Sherman] was retreating to Chattanooga.”69 Such a rumor may have given gave 
Baughman and others hope that Lee’s army could break out and force Grant’s 
army to retreat in a similar manner while also calming fears among soldiers with 
loved ones in Georgia and other parts of the Deep South.
Sherman never withdrew as Baughman had believed. Yet, as Sherman’s 
army moved relatively unopposed through Georgia and into the Carolinas, 
optimistic rumors never faded among Confederates. Instead, these rumors 
continued to affect Confederate soldiers forced to decide whether to fight on. A 
letter written from Nathaniel Venable Watkins to his wife in February predicted 
that he thought Sherman would run into a “trap of some kind” that would finally 
“destroy his army.”70 Less than two weeks before Lee evacuated Petersburg and 
Richmond, Private Edward Armstrong of North Carolina wrote home to his cousin 
that he had heard that Confederate General Joseph Johnston was about to “whip 
Sherman,” that Johnston would “no doubt” receive reinforcements, and that 
Sherman would never be able to march through their home state as easily as he 
had through South Carolina.71 Sherman’s success proved to be an instrument of 
psychological warfare that convinced many soldiers defending Petersburg to 
desert, but it was not as effective against Lee’s army as one might assume.
69 Charles Baughman to his father, 4 October 1864, MOC.
70 Nathaniel V. Watkins to his wife, 23 February 1865, SWEM.
71 Edward Armstrong to his cousin, 22 March 1865, MOC.
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Those who stayed despite the overwhelming success of Sherman’s march did so 
by investing hope in mostly false information. The high number of references to 
Sherman’s army by Confederate soldiers at Petersburg depicts the environment 
they lived in -  one in which men sought but often could not obtain definitive 
answers about the fate of families, land, and property back home.
Soldiers also expressed optimism because they did not want to believe 
that their sacrifices had been for nothing. In March 1864, Richard Brooks wrote 
to his mother responding to a rumor that the army would soon evacuate 
Petersburg: “Now I cannot believe that General Lee will give up a place he has 
spent so much time and labor on, and has rendered almost impregnable.”72 
Having to admit defeat after nearly four years of bloodshed was difficult for many 
of the men. Charles Baughman’s letter to his wife demonstrates the power of 
individual investment and sacrifice, “We have no idea of submitting after having 
underwent all the hardships and dangers of the last four years,” he wrote.73 Such 
an expression was not uncommon from the soldiers who stayed, and this attitude 
made defeat an unacceptable option. While men continued to fight at Petersburg 
in the belief that the war would still be won, many also grasped every opportunity 
to remain optimistic in order to avoid having to declare that their efforts had been 
futile. In many cases, they also hoped to buoy the spirits of loved ones back 
home who were beginning to lose hope.
Loyalty to Robert E. Lee as well as this desire for victory also helps 
explain the strong support among troops at Petersburg for the planned
72 Richard Brooks to his “Ma,” 4 March 1865, Brooks family Papers, LOV.
73 Charles A. Baughman to his wife, 19 January 1865.
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recruitment of African-American soldiers into the Confederate army. When the 
disastrous manpower shortage finally forced lawmakers to pass the measure on 
March 13, 1865, some of Lee’s soldiers could not be convinced to fight alongside 
former slaves, as when one North Carolinian wrote, “I hope they will not send 
[African-American soldiers] to the Army for I don’t want to fight with the 
negroes.”74 Many of them, however, cited Lee’s influence when describing their 
opinions. Charles Baughman wrote simply, “Give Lee negro soldiers if he 
wants.”75 A fellow Virginian noted, “I believe there will be a majority for putting 
them in as soldiers. Gen. Lee is in favor of it I shall cast my vote for it. I am in . 
favor of giving him anything he wants in the way of gaining our independence.”76 
During the final weeks of the war, most soldiers -  one man estimated “nine 
tenths of the army” -  came to agree with opinions such as these.77 While many 
in the Army of Northern Virginia were pragmatic enough to understand the need 
for black soldiers, especially as desertion increased, it still remained a delicate 
issue in all corners of the Confederacy. Given the significance and timing of the 
decision, “Marse Robert's” influence over the opinion of his own men on the 
issue of African-American soldiers is undeniable.
Although many of Lee’s troops eventually came to support the arming of 
slaves to fight for the Confederacy, the war itself forced all soldiers to confront 
important racial issues and cultural values. One such soldier in the Army of 
Northern Virginia predicted that there would be “an awful shaking of the nation”
74 Jeff Toalson, No Soap, No Pay, Diarrhea, Dysentery & Desertion: A Composite Diary of the 
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77 Power, Lee’s Miserables, 253.
30
when black bondage disappeared.78 Confederate troops at Petersburg reveal a 
fragile period of transition caused by the destruction of slavery during the war. 
One significant example occurred in front of Petersburg after the Battle of the 
Crater on July 30, 1864, a battle in which a black Union division made one of the 
failed attacks against the remnants of a blown up Confederate trench. Showing 
what the war had become along with what the future might hold, Anthony Sydnor 
Barksdale wrote home to family in Louisiana that “the slorter of negroes was 
awful.. .It gows mighty against our boys to take negro prisoners. They would 
never do it, if General Lee had not ordered it to be done.”79 African-Americans 
fighting at Petersburg served to intensify the conflict in the minds of the 
Confederates, and it may have provided the motivation necessary to remain in 
the army during the final months of the war.
Other episodes of this nature occurred between Lee’s men and black 
soldiers during their interaction as pickets. While white soldiers from both armies 
tended to minimize the violence on the picket line whenever possible, 
Confederates deliberately escalated the violence when entrenched across from 
colored units. Alabamian Samuel Pickens recorded in his diary that “the Yankee 
lines are [two miles] distant along here. There has been no picket-firing except 
when the Yanks put negro pickets on & then our boys opened on them and kept 
it up till they were taken away the next day.”80 During one period of the battle, 
Union General Ambrose Burnside’s IX corps experienced “vicious” fighting on a
78 Chandra Manning, What this Cruel War was over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War (New 
York: Vintage, 2008), 172.
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daily basis after Confederate soldiers learned that the corps contained a division 
of African-American soldiers.81 Slaveholding soldiers may have had the 
strongest motive to fight and preserve an institution that had made many of them 
wealthy, but Confederates who did not own slaves still felt the need to defend 
racist values by escalating the level of violence at Petersburg. Confederate 
General James Longstreet, as noted earlier, placed his weakest units across 
from black Federal soldiers to persuade his men to stay in the trenches. For 
reasons such as these, had it not been for their own manpower deficit,
Longstreet, Lee and other Confederate leaders might have viewed the presence 
of African-Americans in the Union army as an ironic contributor to soldierly 
motivation and discipline.
The South’s history of slavery affected the actions of Confederate soldiers 
in the trenches also by providing a powerful image of what submission to another 
looked like. That consciousness motivated many to continue fighting. Sergeant 
Andrew Sydnor Barksdale believed that, even if “The North tells us if we come 
back in the Union every state should have its rights,” he would still not approve of 
peace because “[the North] would then commence their deep scheming to get us 
bound both hand and foot.” His rhetoric related surrender to enslavement, and 
he ended the letter with even stronger words: “So now boys of the South take 
fresh courage and let’s fight to the last for Dixie.”82 One North Carolinian writing 
to his brother warned of what he saw as the most dishonorable of consequences 
when he wrote that a Union victory would “set [the black man] free, put him on
81 Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox, 597.
82 Andrew Sydnor Barskdale to unknown, August 1864, MOC.
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equality with you, [allow him to] eat with your Daughter at Church or elsewhere if 
she resists it or insults the Black Scoundrel she is arrested...and taken to 
prisen.”83 Using vivid language to describe their worst fears, these men fought 
under the suspicion that military surrender would also result in the surrender of 
their cherished status as free men.
Terms such as “subjugation” or “submission” came to describe the 
consequences of peace without honor. Charles Baughman, writing home about 
his desire for an “honorable peace,” represented this feeling. “On the peace 
question,” he wrote, “it is true that some of the men are discouraged and ready to 
_ give up, but that feeling is not as widely spread as some persons say. The great 
, majority of us are determined never to submit.”84 At nearly the same time, Silas 
Chandler also wrote from the trenches that “I look upon subjugation as being the 
next thing to death.”85 In a letter designed to cheer up his “despondent” wife,
. D.C. Snyder warned that, “If the cause of the South is lost, all freedom of thought 
and speech is lost and we go back into the old monarchical forms of 
government.”86 Soldiers at Petersburg continually linked defeat with subjugation 
or even enslavement to the conquering Federal armies. These worries, 
especially among soldiers who stayed to fight at Petersburg, stemmed from a 
fear of dishonor -  a realistic threat to white men who grew up in a slave society in 
which males of a different skin color did not own property, could not care for their 
families, and thus lacked the entwined virtues of independence and manhood.
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As the war progressed, events seemingly reinforced these suspicions held 
by Confederate soldiers at Petersburg and served to create a caricature of the 
Northern soldier as a dishonorable plunderer. After hearing news that the Union 
army was once again in his hometown of Fredericksburg, Virginia, cavalryman 
Marshall Decker became especially worried about his wife. “I fear you have been 
stripped of the little you had. I think it is perfectly unnecessary to destroy the 
property of noncombatants and far worse to take from the mouths of the old and 
helpless.”87 In a similar letter eight days later, he described the Yankees’
“wanton destruction” as “barbarous,” added that “God will reward them their just 
deserts” for their “black deeds of plunder,” and cautioned his wife to “keep out of 
their sights. Don’t expose yourself to the gaze of such a rabble.”88 After hearing 
stories about the consequences of defeat in other parts of the South, many 
Confederate soldiers saw no other way to avoid such a fate than continued 
military resistance, if for nothing else than as a method of revenge.
Even as soldiers deserted during Sherman’s March or while Sheridan’s 
army destroyed crops in the Shenandoah Valley, others decided that the Army of 
Northern Virginia was the only organization left that could defend against Union 
“barbarity.” In doing so, they attached personal honor to military duty. After 
learning about Union cavalry movements in the Shenandoah Valley, Captain 
James Whitehorne asked his sister, “did the Yankees during the dusk raid get to 
our house? Write to me at once and let me know if they got there.”89 Robert 
Pooler Myers, a surgeon from Georgia, recorded in his diary during October,
87 Marshall Elton Decker to his wife Alphia Ellen, 2 June 1864, Decker Papers, LOV.
88 Ibid., 10 June 1864.
89 James Whitehorne to his sister, 8 July 1864, Whitehorne Family Papers, LOV.
34
1864, that the enemy had “destroyed everything in their way -  burning Mills, 
barns, fences and also all the private property they could put their hands on -  
even to wearing apparel of women and children,” a dishonorable trait if there ever 
was one.90 By the time of the Siege of Petersburg, the war’s carnage was 
expanding to directly affect a greater number of communities in the South, and 
one important element of southern honor, writes Wyatt-Brown was “honor as 
immortalizing valor, particularly in the character of revenge against familial and 
community enemies.”91 As fears became reality for soldiers at Petersburg -  after 
countless stories of the sufferings of helpless women, children, and elderly 
reached the trenches -  many of them chose what they viewed as the honorable 
path and stayed in the army to defend the white South against the specter of 
debasement and tyranny. With each new Union military success, honor’s 
demand that individual soldiers continue risking their lives, grew even stronger 
for many.
Describing this phenomenon as the “powerful inertia generated by the 
war,” Aaron Sheehan-Dean explains that “Union depredations exacerbated 
already deep-seated antipathies toward the North that formed a component of 
[white Southerners’] attachment to the Confederacy.”92 The communication 
between civilians and soldiers during this stage of the war became particularly 
important as rumors could provoke a variety of emotions and actions. Writing to 
his son, a private at Petersburg in February 1865, Davis M. Wood averred that 
he did not believe in “Yankee sincerity.” He also urged his son to “endure
90 Personal diary of Robert Pooler Myers, 16th Georgia Infantry, MOC.
91 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 34.
92 Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought, 181-182.
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bravely” and avoid the “trashy” northern newspapers because “they are corrupt in 
style and unfit for a Southern Man to read.”93 Andrew R. Barber wrote home to 
his cousin in Dublin, Virginia: “I have just read a letter from Bro. Gabl. & Daughter 
Mollie giving account of depredations &c of the Yankees. They now know & feel 
what I knew & was made to feel nearly four years ago -  only they have never 
been made to suffer from the vandals as I have suffered.”94 Barber, a dedicated 
secessionist from the beginning, described the growing contempt for Federal 
forces as the war escalated to directly affect a greater number of civilians. One 
wife wrote to her husband about General Sheridan’s scorched earth policy in the 
Shenandoah Valley that the “Yankees behaved very shamefully to Mrs. Sturman 
-  took every eatable out of her house -  meat, lard, and everything -  More rapes 
committed on [the] nicest ladies.”95
Because soldiers concerned themselves with the welfare of local 
communities, the white women of the South had as powerful an influence on the 
final fate of Lee’s army as the individual soldiers themselves did. The first priority 
of every soldier who had loved ones at home was to ensure their safety. In an 
undated letter written from Petersburg to his wife Ella, A.E. Decker concluded: “I 
am dependent on thee therefore I hope and pray you will take special care of 
yourself.”96 Worried that he might never see her again, William H. Bowling wrote 
to his wife two weeks before the Confederate evacuation of Petersburg that he 
would be sending her a ring to keep any future suitors away from her should he
93 Toalson, No Soap, No Pay, Diarrhea, Dysentery & Desertion, 325.
94 Andrew R. Barber to his cousin Mary Anna Silbert, 23 October 1864, Valley Personal Papers, 
UVA, http://valley.lib.virginia.edu/papers/A7511.
95 Toalson, No Soap, No Pay, Diarreah, Dysentery, and Desertion, 199.
96 A.E. Decker to wise his Ella, undated, Decker Papers, LOV.
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never return home, because he expected that boys would “be flying a Round” 
her.97 As rumors rose about the potential evacuation of the Confederate capital, 
Charles Baughman became concerned about whether his family would leave the 
city, “[If you have to evacuate], do you think it would be admirable for you, mom, 
and [his sister] Minnie to stay in Richmond?”98 Amid crisis and uncertainty, 
Confederate soldiers at Petersburg revealed apprehension not only about their 
own welfare, but especially the fate of Confederate women.
Relations with civilians at home became important for preserving not only 
individual honor, but the family’s reputation as well. During the winter of 1865, 
for example, Silas Chandler wrote to his wife to express his worries about the 
future of his family: “If I were to desert it would be a disgrace on me and my 
children forever.”99 In their letters, some of these men displayed concerns about 
the participation of other family members in the war. In a November message to 
his sister, Fred Brode wrote that a boy in the family named Lucius should sign up 
to join the army now that he was older. He even stated that “anyone under the 
age of conscription and coming from enemy lines [such as parts of Louisiana] 
has the privilege of joining [any regiment] he chooses.”100 Brode was interested 
not only in further recruitment but also in preserving the honor of a younger 
family member. Similarly, Baughman helpfully responded to his father’s 
disappointment that he was too old to join by telling him that he should not feel 
ashamed about claiming exemption, as “his health would not have lasted long in
97 William H. Bowling to his wife, 19 March 1865, William H. Bowling Letter, LOV.
98 Charles Baughman to his father, 25 January 1865, MOC.
99 Silas Chandler to his wife, 25 January 1865, LOV.
100 Fred A. Brode to his sister, 5 Nov 1864, MOC.
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the trenches.”101 Here, Baughman acknowledged that his father was not acting 
with dishonor by not serving in the military.
In these instances, letters from Petersburg to families show a strong and 
supportive connection between soldiers on the front lines and civilians at home.
In different instances, and especially during the war’s final months, other soldiers 
began to feel powerfully disconnected from civilian society. Many letters written 
from the trenches at Petersburg exhibit a strong discontentment, bordering on 
hatred, regarding the population at home. Nathaniel Watkins wrote to his wife 
that the South should send all able-bodied men to Petersburg at once because 
there were “Thousands at home now.” He continued with harsh words about the 
South as a whole: “I wish every man, woman, and child in the South would forget 
how to pronounce the word [peace]...time for people to suffer a few hardships 
the army has been bearing for years.”102
Just as women who remained loyal to the Confederacy helped motivate 
soldiers to stay in the trenches, supposedly disloyal women caused the soldiers 
who stayed at Petersburg much anxiety. J.F.J. Caldwell noted at the beginning 
of 1865 that “the very women began to fail us,” explaining that the “bloodshed 
had sickened them; their losses and their wants had become irritating to them. 
They began to complain, they lost heart, and, as a class they finally sat down and 
left us to ourselves.”103 In the same letter in which Baughman eased his father’s 
concerns about honor, he also ascribed dishonor to sister: “I suspect she is 
becoming like the rest of the girls, all of whom seem to prefer cowards to brave
101 Charles Baughman to his father, 14 October 1864, MOC.
102 Nathaniel V. Watkins to his wife, 19 January 1865, SWEM.
103 Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, 250.
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men.”104 Support from home naturally decreased after military failures at 
Petersburg and elsewhere, and the letters of loyal men in the trenches portray a 
divided white population in the South that had a negative influence on the army’s 
morale. Many of those who stayed relied upon soldierly devotion to best defend 
their honor and were unforgiving when they believed the civilian population failed 
to appreciate their sacrifices.
In his book about Civil War society, Embattled Courage, Gerald F. 
Linderman writes about the contrast between civilian understandings of the war 
and the reality of the conflict for soldiers, especially during 1864 and 1865. 
Generally speaking, according to Linderman, there are “two wars:” one 
experienced by civilians and the other by combatants. Secondly, as the war 
progresses, these different experiences by different groups in society can 
eventually “jeopardize soldier morale...and the cohesiveness of the nation’s 
military forces.”105 While such a gulf in experience may have been more 
profound in the Union, whose states remained mostly untouched by large-scale 
military confrontations, the Confederate army still experienced difficulties of this 
nature. One letter written from the trenches at Petersburg in January 1865 
mentioned Confederate soldiers rejoicing about the news of Union victories. The 
same letter also targets other white Southerners, perhaps of a more privileged 
class, by claiming that “Only fat cats want war to [the] bitter end.”106 Whatever 
forces motivated this man and his comrades to continue to do their duty in the
104 Charles Baughman to his father, 6 February 1865, MOC.
105 Linderman, Embattled Courage, 1.
106 EBS to his wife (no further identification of either), 17 January 1865, University of Duke, 
Durham, NC.
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Confederate army despite their bitterness, his letter to his wife indicates a divide 
within the Confederacy at the end of the war that undoubtedly affected the 
soldiers in the trenches. Even among Confederates who remained within the 
Army of Northern Virginia late in the war there were some who seemed 
paradoxically to openly reject the idea of “fighting to the last for Dixie.”
At least as important, however, were the soldiers who banded together to 
defend the Confederacy while civilian support fell. Unlike the soldiers who grew 
despondent at Petersburg, som soldiers, according to Sheehan-Dean, felt 
motivated by the differences between soldiers and civilians. “One of the many 
paradoxes of the war in Virginia, was that the sense of persecution, almost living 
martyrdom, that many Confederate soldiers felt by 1864 imbued them with new 
resolve even as it isolated them from the people whom they fought to protect.”107 
Not only did soldiers defending Petersburg worry about the welfare of themselves 
and of loved ones back home; the conflict of opinion over the war effort also 
complicated decisions about whether to stay or to attempt desertion. For many 
of these soldiers, the growing diversity of opinion throughout the South provided 
an opportunity to declare their loyalty to the Confederacy during its weakest hour.
Beginning in January 1865, Confederate units began coming together in 
order to sign resolutions in which they declared their loyalty and willingness to 
continue fighting the war. Many of these declarations were published in 
newspapers in order to inspire civilians to continue supporting the army and its 
efforts to fight the Union forces. Published on January 28, the 1st Virginia 
Cavalry addressed their “friends at home” and their “comrades in arms,” stating
107 Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought, 157.
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that “it would rather become us, if we are free, to prepare vigorously for another
year of war” and that “such a course alone will lead to a speedy, lasting, and
honorable peace.”108 A particularly powerful resolution by the Palmetto Battery
from South Carolina read:
We desire peace on no other terms than our recognition as an 
independent nation; that we will endure all hardships, dangers and 
suffering; and rather than submit to be the slaves of a Northern 
despot, we will fall with our backs to the field and our faces to the 
foe like ‘Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans, who are still free 
in their proud charnel at Thermopylae.’109
J.F.J. Caldwell summarized his brigade’s February statement by recalling:
We had determined to carry on the contest as long as it should be 
at all possible, and we desired General Lee, the Congress, and the 
people of the South to know it; and therefore we did not hesitate to 
publish resolutions of as warlike a tone as the most ultra­
secessionist could demand. But we were obliged to feel that the 
nation was on the point of submission, which required to be 
sustained in its position by a half-famished, half-naked army of fifty 
thousand men.
Upon adoption of this resolution, General McGowan, the brigade commander, 
visited his soldiers to give them a rousing speech that also served, according to 
Caldwell, to “animate” the troops.110 The resolutions did not put an end to 
desertion in the ranks. Flowever, stemming from the ranks of soldiers 
themselves, they represent many soldiers’ continued commitment to the cause 
as well as their desire to rally civilian support by publicly declaring the noble 
intention of self-defense.
Passing these resolutions also made the decision to stay and fight an 
easier one for men who could not know the true intentions of their fellow soldiers,
108 “Spirit of the Army,” Richmond Enquirer, 28 January 1865.
109 Ibid., 18 February 1865.
110 Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, 262.
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or as one man explained to his wife, “I can’t see what the men are thinking 
about.”111 Wyatt-Brown writes that oath-taking was relied upon as a “bond in lieu 
of family obligations and allegiances.”112 When the army’s many individual units 
adopted resolutions during the final months of the war at Petersburg, they added 
the tradition of oath-taking to build camaraderie and keep the army together. No 
Confederate soldier who stayed to fight at Petersburg wanted to have the 
experience undergone by William Myers from North Carolina when he woke up in 
January 1865 “very much surprised” to find that all of his friends had deserted in 
the middle of the night.113 The 1865 resolutions helped soldiers communicate 
with the civilian population, but also served to mitigate the mistrust among 
soldiers forced to question one another’s willingness to continue fighting for an 
honorable peace.
Many in Lee’s army at Petersburg spoke often of their desire for an 
“honorable peace.” They may not have been able to define the term, but their 
words and actions hint that honor was far more important than peace. From the 
trenches of Petersburg in January 1865, one such Confederate expressed inner 
conflict about the end of the war. He clearly desired an “honorable peace or 
none,” but also wrote about having heard that “[the North] will acknowledge our 
independence and [we will] form an alliance with them to uphold the Monroe 
Doctrine. That is, help them drive the French out of Mexico and the British out of 
Canada.”114 This hopeful story shows that Confederate soldiers might stay on
111 Silas Chandler to his wife, 21 February 1865, LOV.
112 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 34
113 William L. Myers to his wife, 12 January 1865, LOV.
114 Luther L. Swank to his sister, 29 January 1865, LOV.
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the front for honor's sake even as they could be as desperate for peace as any 
other rational American by that point in the war. It is an important opinion 
because it represents the confusion of those who stayed as they tried to 
reconcile their need to defend honor with their desire for peace.
The aspiration for an honorable peace also became the foundation for the 
events at Appomattox Courthouse. Of those Confederates who decided to stay 
at the Siege of Petersburg, many eventually had no choice but to evacuate the 
defenses when Union forces broke through Confederate lines southwest of 
Petersburg on April 2, 1865. On that day, Lee made the decision to give up the 
Confederate capital along with Petersburg in an attempt to join with the remnants 
of Johnston’s army to the South. A week later, however, Lee found his army cut­
off almost devoid of supplies at Appomattox Courthouse. Lee finally 
surrendered. At such points in history, times when war and peace blend 
together, events become largely unpredictable. Luckily for the country as a 
whole, the two armies that gathered for the famous surrender at Appomattox 
Courthouse understood one another well enough to make a successful transition 
out of war. The events following the surrender of Lee’s army in April 1865 reveal 
the main concerns that had characterized Confederate soldiers at Petersburg 
throughout the siege.
First of all, many who remained in the Army of Northern Virginia at the end 
of the war were motivated to continue resisting if necessary. Robert Stiles 
recounted the army’s escape from Petersburg as a relief, conveying yet another 
rumor about the Confederate army drawing the enemy into a trap away from the
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trenches. He compared his situation to a story of a child attempting to build up 
the courage to jump from an elevated bluff and the advice he gave the 
adolescent, “Don’t you see -  the jumping-off place is not the end of all things? 
Never say die! If you must leave your present position and jump off, do it like a 
man and make the best of it. The end is not yet.”115 While Stiles likely 
exaggerated his feelings while writing his memoir years later, it is still interesting 
that he remembered about the escape from Petersburg his determination to fight 
on “like a man.” Willing to risk everything to secure honor, soldiers carried on 
their military duty when the potential consequences of surrender seemed worse 
than death. Given the motivation of many in Lee’s army to continue against 
overwhelming odds, how did the end occur in such an abrupt and peaceful 
manner?
One sure answer is starvation. Many of Lee’s men could not physically 
escape surrender or continue to battle the Union army. A more fulfilling 
explanation of why soldiers present at Appomattox went home quietly, even after 
being fed, concerns the understanding the two armies had of one another. The 
soldiers certainly came to dislike one another during the final, violent year of the 
war in Virginia, but Lincoln, Grant and the Army of the Potomac understood that 
the Confederate soldiers who remained desired an honorable peace or “none at 
all.” The peace process went smoothly, then, partly because Grant allowed the 
Southerners finally to separate individual honor from military duty. Contrary to 
their worst fears, Confederate soldiers were not forced into servitude and were 
not required to give up their land to a conquering army. During the surrender at
115 Stiles, Four Years under Marse Robert, 317-319.
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Appomattox Courthouse, the fears that had motivated Confederate soldiers to
reluctantly continue fighting quietly vanished. Instead, soldiers peacefully went
home as free men, guilty of no crime, and free to raise and provide for their
families once again. Many of them even managed to come away with horses
and mules, a necessity to rebuild farms that had been ruined by war.
More than to anyone else, however, it was left to General Lee to persuade
his men of the merits of their terms for surrender. He understood that he had
loyal followers who needed assurance that they had maintained honor -  that they
could walk home after a military defeat without shame. In his famous farewell
address to the Army of Northern Virginia on April 10, 1865, General Lee touched
the heart of the issue by writing,
After four years of arduous service marked by unsurpassed 
courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been 
compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources. I need 
not tell the survivors of so many hard fought battles who have 
remained steadfast to the last that I have consented to this result 
from no distrust of them. You will take with you the satisfaction that 
proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed....116
Lee understood that honor had motivated his men to fight during the gloomiest
days at Petersburg. His farewell address not only allows one to better understand
the Army of Northern Virginia at the time of its defeat; the message also attests
to the important role that notions of honor had played during the war and would
continue to play in the years thereafter.
Especially during the desperate weeks at Petersburg, Lee could always
sympathize with his men on the issue of honor and reputation. During the final
116 Robert E. Lee, Farewell Address to the Army of Northern Virginia, 10 April 1865, Appomattox 
Courthouse, VA.
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day of fighting around Petersburg on April 2, 1865, Robert E. Lee provided rare 
insight into his own conflicted thoughts after the death of Lt. General A.P. Hill. 
When Hill failed to rally his men and delay the successful Union assault, he was 
shot through the heart and killed instantly. After survivors reported the death to 
Lee, he replied solemnly, “He is at rest now, and we who are left are the ones to 
suffer.”117 Lee, whose decision whether or not to continue fighting carried the 
most inftuence on the future of the country, expressed the conflicted state of 
mind felt by all individual Confederate soldiers who were suffering in a state of 
uncertainty at Petersburg. They wanted to escape the privations and violence of 
war, but they also could not risk the dishonor of submission. Lee’s surrender 
came later than it needed to, but it also secured both peace and honor for 28,000 
Confederate soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia.
However, the war did not end on April 9, and there remained tens of 
thousands of Confederate soldiers still unwilling to submit to the Union armies, 
including soldiers who had decided to stay and fight at Petersburg. Alabamian 
Samuel Pickens was one of the thousands of Southerners captured by Union 
forces a week earlier on April 2, 1865, who refused to take the oath of loyalty to 
the Union. Instead of going home to friends and family in Alabama, Pickens 
believed his honor continued to be at risk, so he lived in a prisoner of war camp 
for an entire month before Federal officials could convince him to take the oath 
and accept release. To him and the many other Confederate soldiers who 
resisted even after the bitter end, “yankee” victory still threatened dishonorable 
results.
117 Greene, Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion, 350.
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Upon hearing the news that Lee’s army had finally surrendered, Pickens 
titled his diary entry from prison on April 10, 1865 “Horror of horrors.”118 A month 
later, he continued to be suspicious about taking the oath of loyalty and wrote in 
his diary from prison worried that the Federal government would “publish to the 
world that [former Confederates] took the [loyalty] oath voluntarily” and that they 
would use this to prove that “the poor deluded, ignorant creatures were duped, 
misguided and forced into this war.”119 History teaches that soldiers had little to 
fear once they finally surrendered to Grant’s army, yet this fact was not obvious 
to the many soldiers who risked their lives to avoid taking an oath of loyalty to the 
United States. Many of them equated surrender with dishonor and remained 
stubbornly opposed to taking an oath that by some standards would have sent 
them home with more honor than they could have hoped for while entrenched at 
Petersburg.
118 Hobbs, Voices from Company D, 370.
119 Ibid., 377.
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Conclusion
Published histories by white Southerners during the months and years 
following the war often focused on the soldiers who followed Lee obediently 
during the Siege of Petersburg, rather than upon topics of treason or slavery. In 
later years, veterans re-attached personal honor to military duty by glorifying 
Lee’s soldiers as a unified group with a virtuous cause. Jubal Early, a 
commander of soldiers who never gave in to Union pressures until the final 
surrender, contributed to this legacy of the Army of Northern Virginia when he 
gave a speech honoring General Lee in 1872. In the speech he stated his 
memory of the surrender: “The remnant of the Army of Northern Virginia fell 
back, more than one-hundred miles, before its overpowering antagonist. Finally 
from mere exhaustion, less than 8,000 men with arms in their hands, of the 
noblest army that ever fought in the tide of time were surrendered at Appomattox 
to an army of 150,000 men.”120 In offering such a dramatized view of the 
moment, Early’s speech emphasized the honorable characteristics of military 
valor and undaunted courage -  a legacy that would be embraced by as well as 
attached to the soldiers who fought under Lee at Petersburg. In reality, the Army 
of Northern Virginia continued to fight at Petersburg in 1865 because men with 
conflicted hearts and minds were understandingly confused about what kind of 
future peace would bring to their families and communities. Notions of honor had 
only served to intensify the confusion at Petersburg.
120 Jubal Early, in Recollections and Letters of General Lee by Robert E. Lee, Jr. (New York: 
Doubleday, Page, & Co., 1904), 148.
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Today, 150 years removed from a terrible Civil War, it is interesting to ask 
how and why Americans remember the war. How is it that a country so divided 
in a war that cost the United States roughly two percent of its population can 
continue to honor men who chose to secede from and fight against their country? 
To answer this question, one cannot ignore the final months of the Siege at 
Petersburg that led to the surrender at Appomattox. The Confederate soldiers 
who stayed to fight at Petersburg exemplify the types of questions Americans 
must confront when attempting to understand the Civil War. In one sense, these 
soldiers prolonged a war in defense of an immoral cause. From another 
perspective, they overcame unimaginable hardships to do their duty and defend 
their honor. J. Tracy Power concludes his book by stating that “those who 
persevered from the Wilderness to Appomattox... set a standard that is a fitting 
testament to the resiliency of the human spirit, that quality that above all others 
made the Army of Northern Virginia such a cohesive community of men and such 
a formidable body of soldiers.”121
The Siege of Petersburg solidified this legacy of the Confederate soldiers 
in the Army of Northern Virginia. Yet, it is also important to remember the divides 
within the army and the Confederacy as a whole, which caused everything from 
desertion to persistence, from pessimism to unfailing confidence. Leaders of 
both North and South understood that many of the Confederate soldiers left 
standing at the end continued to fight from the trenches, because it was their last 
hope for honor in a world full of unimaginable unknowns. To understand the end 
of the war, it is necessary to study the men who never deserted at Petersburg.
121 Power, Lee’s Miserables, 321.
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Similarly, to understand how Americans remember the Civil War today, one 
cannot overlook Lee’s band of followers and the prestige they won during peace. 
For better and worse, those who stood fast in defense of Petersburg managed to 
achieve the peace with honor that they had fought for.
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